Bennett attributes ontological antirealism to logical positivists. For Bennett, positivists questioned the idea that a statement about an object’s relationship, such as «a table is actually a table,» is also a statement about that object, which Bennett calls an «ontological» statement. According to Bennett, ontological statements are too «abstract» to be true. For Bennett, an ontological statement about an object must represent the state of affairs with an object and must be able to justify a statement about an object. Thus, from Bennett’s point of view, a statement about the relationship of an object, such as «a table is actually a table», is also a true ontological statement, but its truth is incompatible with the truth of another ontological statement concerning the same object, that is, its relation to chair. Because of this incompatibility, statements about this object cannot be true if both statements are not true, which would be incompatible with the true nature of the object.